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Carriage of Goods by Sea: Should the
United States Ratify the Hamburg
Rules?
By MICHAEL C. DAvIs*
Member of the Class of1980
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 1978, the United Nations Conference on the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea adopted the Hamburg Rules to replace the
Hague Rules of 1924 as the guiding instrument on international car-
riage of goods by sea. The United States has signed but not yet ratified
the new rules. The new rules embody several changes in the liability
for cargo damaged or lost in transit by sea. This note will focus on the
two most important substantive changes: The elimination of the so-
called "catalogue of exemptions,"' and the change in the maximum
liability limitation.2
An evaluation of the new rules in light of the current status of the
United States law leads to the conclusion that the new rules should be
ratified. Nevertheless, the new rules are not without problems. Ambi-
guity in the language of one provision in particular may warrant some
modification.3 In other areas, the rules do not go quite far enough.4
* I would like to add a special thanks to Mr. Thomas McCune of the law firm of
Lillick, McHose & Charles, for serving as my advisor on this note. The conclusions, how-
ever, are all my own.
1. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, § 4(2) (a)-(q), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (a)-(q) (1976)
[hereinafter cited as COGSA].
2. COGSA, supra note 1, at § 4(5), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976). Less significant statu-
tory changes are not discussed in this article. The most frequently mentioned of these
changes involve the time bar, "deviation," deck cargo and the time period of coverage. For
an explanation of these concepts see Sweeney, The UNCITIM4L Draft Convention on Car-
riage of Goods by Sea, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 69-125, 327-50, 487-503, 615-70 (1975-76), 8 3.
MAR. L. & COM. 167-94 (1976-77). The economic question of insurance is frequently men-
tioned. See generally Kimball, Shopowner's Liability and the Proposed Reviion of the Hague
Rules, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 217, 221 (1975-76).
3. See the discussion of the provision extending coverage beyond the tackle-to-tackle
period at text accompanying note 114. Modification of the Hague Rules is, however, un-
likely because it is a multilateral treaty.
4. See the discussion of the fire exemption at text accompanying notes 66-68.
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But in general the rules are a remarkable achievement for a multilat-
eral agreement hammered out through years of complex negotiation.
In considering the analysis below, the reader should keep in mind (1)
the problems with the current rules, (2) the extent to which ratification
will change the current law, and (3) the effect of these changes, espe-
cially in relation to the abandonment of the much litigated terms of art.
Both the Hague Rules and the Hamburg Rules seek to answer the
critical question: who bears the loss when goods are damaged or lost?5
The history of United States resolution of this question is outlined in
the following discussion.
A. The Current United States Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea
The responsibility for risk of loss has changed throughout United
States history, ranging from absolute carrier liability in the early nine-
teenth century to a system of fault liability with numerous carrier ex-
emptions today. These exemptions relieve carriers from liability for
employee negligence in certain situations. At common law, the only
exception to absolute carrier liability was loss caused by an act of God,
the public enemy, inherent vice of the goods, or the fault of the shipper.
These exceptions operated only in the absence of carrier negligence.6
With the growing use of the bill of lading in the middle nineteenth
century carriers began to contractually exempt themselves from liabil-
ity,7 including exemption from liability for their own negligence.8 The
contractual dissipation of common law liability resulted in a basic shift
in responsibility for damaged goods from the carrier to the shipper.
The British and American courts differed in their attitude towards
negligence exemptions. The British courts favored the carrier and gen-
erally upheld negligence exemptions,9 but the American courts refused
to enforce such clauses as contrary to public policy.' 0 American courts
held such contractual exemptions to be subject to two overriding obli-
5. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 139 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
6. Id. at 139; Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 23 (1859); Clark v.
Barnwell, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 272, 279-80 (1851).
7. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 140.
8. Id. at 142.
9. In re Missouri S.S. Co., 42 Ch. D. 321 (1889); The Xanthos, 12 A.C. 503, 515 (1887);
Chartered Mercantile Bank v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co., 10 QB.D. 521
(1882); Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand, 3 Moo P.C. (N.S.) 272 (1865);
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 142.
10. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 438-63
(1889); New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848);
The Energia, 56 F. 124, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1893); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 142.
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gations. The first obligation was to use "due care" with respect to the
cargo, and the second was to exercise "due diligence" to furnish a "sea-
worthy" ship at the beginning of the voyage." The difference between
American and British law emphasized the basic tension between carrier
and shipper interests. In the middle nineteenth century, Britain was
largely a carrier nation while American interests predominately fa-
vored the shipper. 2
The Harter Act,'" enacted in 1893, represented an American com-
promise between these competing interests. 4 The Harter Act codified
the pro-shipper approach of American common law, retaining the
"over-riding obligation" of the carrier to exercise "due diligence" in
providing a seaworthy ship and "due care" with respect to cargo.' 5 Yet
the Harter Act favored carrier interests as well, creating the "manage-
ment or navigation" exemption. This exemption relieved the carrier
from liability for damage to cargo due to negligence in the "manage-
ment or navigation" of the vessel. 16
The Hague Rules, modeled largely after the Harter Act, were
adopted in an international convention in 1924.' 7 The United States
ratified the Hague Rules twelve years later in the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA).'
COGSA continues the Harter Act compromise between carrier
and cargo interests. COGSA imposes on the carrier the overriding ob-
ligation to exercise "due diligence" in providing a seaworthy ship and
"due care" with respect to cargo. 19 COGSA continues the "navigation
or management" exemption.20 COGSA also codifies several other ex-
11. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 140.
12. Id. at 142.
13. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96.
14. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 143.
15. Harter Act §§ 1-2, 46 U.S.C. §§ 191-92 (1976).
16. Id. § 192.
17. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter cited as the Hague Rules].
For the official United States translation see A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN
BILLS OF LADING 41 (4th ed. 1953). About 80% of the world's seaborne trade is carried on
vessels subject to the Hague Rules. Sassoon, Liabiiiyfor the International Carriage of Goodr
by Sea, Land andAir: Some Comparisons, 3 J. MAR. L. & Coti. 759, 760 (1972).
18. COGSA, supra note 1 at §§ 1-15, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1976). Though COGSA
was enacted in 1936, actual ratification of the Hague Rules occurred in 1937. The United
States announced that in the event of a conflict between the enacting legislation (COGSA)
and the Hague Rules text, the former would prevail. A. KNAUTH, supra note 17, at 77. For
a discussion of the conflicts see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 165, 172, 185-86.
19. COGSA, supra note 1, at § 3, 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
20. Id. § 4(2)(a), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976).
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emptions,2 the most important being the fire exemption.22 The fire ex-
emption relieves the carrier of liability for damage caused by fire,23
Like the "navigation or management" exemption, the fire exemption
relieves the carrier in some cases from liability for crew negligence.
The other carrier exemptions under COGSA are not as significant as
the aforementioned since they would generally be available in cases of
non-negligence.
Departing from the Harter Act pattern, COGSA limits a carrier's
liability for goods lost or damaged in transit to five hundred dollars per
package or customary frieght unit.24 Within this scheme, the definition
of package has been intensively litigated.
COGSA applies only to international shipping. The Harter Act,
where not preempted by COGSA, applies to international and domes-
tic shipping. 25 Developments in United States shipping law have been
confined to judicial interpretation of these two statutes since the enact-
ment of COGSA.26
B. The Hamburg Rules
Concern that the Harter Act compromise, which exempts carriers
from liability for certain types of crew negligence, favored carrier over
21. Id. § 4(2)(c)-(q), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(c)-(q) (1976).
22. Id. § 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
23. This exemption was not new to United States law. A statute relieving the carrier
from liability for fire damage had been enacted in 1851 and the same statute is still in force
today concurrently with the COGSA fire exemption. See Fire Statute, 46 U.S.C. § 182
(1976).
24. COGSA, supra note 1, at § 4(5), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
25. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 145-47 for an explanation of the scope of
COGSA and the Harter Act. The Harter Act is superceded in areas specifically covered by
COGSA (Id. at 147) but is still applicable to the time period prior to cargo delivery and
following discharge. I. HALL, M. KATZMAN & A. SANN, 2a BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 14
(7th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY.]
26. Internationally, the Hague-Visby Protocol amending the Hague Rules was adopted
in 1968. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, reported in Bills ofLading, Report by
UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.41SL/6/Rev. 1 (1971). The Hague-Visby Proto-
col became operative with the ratification of 10 nations on June 23, 1977: Denmark, Ecua-
dor, France, Lebanon, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and United
Kingdom. The Hague- Visby Rules Now Operative in United Kingdom, 4 LLOYDS MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 512 (1977). The United States is not a signatory.
The Hague-Visby Protocol makes substantive changes in the area of limitation of liabil-
ity but it still retains the basic Harter Act compromise embodied in the carrier exemptions,
Major changes embodied in the Visby Protocol include increasing the liability limitation,
defining "package" and extending the carrier's defenses and liability limitations to include
the "servants or agents" of the carrier. Id. at 512.
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shipper interests led to the adoption of the Hamburg Rules.27 The
Hamburg Rules make the carrier liable for crew negligence by elimi-
nating the carrier liability exemptions.28 Otherwise, the Hamburg
Rules continue a negligence liability regime.29 Liability is limited in a
manner similar to COGSA's liability limitation. The Hamburg Rules,
however, provide a new approach for determining maximum liability,
which avoids the problem of defining a package.
II. THE EXEMPTIONS
The elimination of the navigation or management exemption30
and the fire exemption3' under the Hamburg Rules shifts to the carrier
substantial responsibility for lost or damaged goods. 32 Without the
27. In 1970 the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published a
report entitled Bills of Lading which was the genesis of the effort to reform the liability
regime for carriage of goods by sea. Bills oaLading, supra note 26. This report recognized
that the current liability regime placed an inordinate burden on cargo interest, a burden
which proved particularly onerous for developing nations. Id. at 19-29. The carrier exemp-
tions which are peculiar to sea carriage of goods and the ambiguities which exist in the
Hague Rules were identified as the main grounds of concern. .d. at 73. UNCTAD referred
to the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) its proposals to reform
the Hague Rules. UNCITRAL completed a new draft convention in 1975, and it adopted a
final draft at its ninth session in May 1976. For the text of this draft see 8 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 267. The U.N. Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea adopted this draft with
some minor modifications in March 1978. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, 1978 A.M.C. 1036 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hamburg Rules]. As of No-
vember 21, 1979, 27 nations have signed the Convention: Austria, Brazil, Czechoslovakia,
Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana,
Hungary, Madagascar, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Vatican,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Venezuela, United States (April 20, 1979), and
Zaire. Only Egypt has ratified the Convention. Uganda and Tanzania have become parties
by accession.
28. Hamburg Rules, supra note 27, at art. 5(1). "The Carrier is liable for loss resulting
from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence
which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the goods were in his charge as
defined in Article 4, unless the carrierproves that he, his senranis or agents took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences." (emphasis
added). It is arguable that absolute liability would better achieve the UNCTAD objective
and provide greater certainty but that appears politically impossible.
29. These exemptions, the "navigation or management" defense and the fire exemption,
are at the heart of the Harter Act compromise. See text accompanying notes 19-20.
30. COGSA, supra note I, at § 4(2)(a), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976).
31. Id. § 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
32. The Hamburg Rules also eliminate the other COGSA liability exemptions. Id.
§ 4(2)(c)-(q), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(c)-(q) (1976). Since the other COGSA liability exemptions
are not available if the damage is caused by carrier negligence their elimination under the
basic negligence liability regime of the Hamburg Rules should not effect any major change;
if the carrier is not negligent it will not be liable with or without the other exemptions and if
the carrier's negligence is the cause of damage it is liable regardless of the exemptions. The
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protection of these two exemptions, the carrier is responsible for crew
negligence. Their elimination also lends greater certainty to the eco-
nomic relations involved. By avoiding the statutory uncertainty associ-
ated with the exemptions, the carrier and shipper can determine where
the risks lie in advance of a voyage. Certainty is especially important
in this area to reduce duplicative insurance coverage. A critical analy-
sis of the navigation or management exemption and the fire exemption
follows.
A. The Navigation or Management Exemption
Under the Harter Act and COGSA, the carrier must exercise "due
diligence" to provide a seaworthy vessel and "due care" in relation to
cargo.33 Yet the carrier is exempted from liability for damage to cargo
caused by negligent navigation or management of the vessel. 34
In applying the law, the courts have a twofold task: first, the court
must determine whether the carrier exercised "due diligence" in ini-
tially providing a seaworthy vessel. If the first question is answered
affirmatively the court will then determine whether cargo damage re-
sulted from negligence in the navigation or management of the vessel
or from negligence in the care of cargo. These two questions have been
troublesome for the courts in applying both COGSA and the Harter
Act.35 Seemingly similar fact situations have led couris to inconsistent
burden of proof under the Hamburg Rules is generally on the carrier. Similarly, in order to
gain other exemptions under COGSA, the carrier has the burden of establishing its own lack
of negligence. The burden of proof rests with the carrier for all of the exemptions except
where the carrier has shown that the loss was caused by the overwhelming force of third
persons, the fault of the shipper, or the attempt to save life or property. GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 5, at 185. See also 2A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 25, at 2-14. Cases
interpreting the current rules on this negligence question will be useful for a court applying
the new Hamburg Rules.
33. Harter Act, § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 191 (1976); COGSA, supra note 1, at § 3, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1303(l)-(2) (1976).
34. Harter Act, § 3, 46 U.S.C. § 193 (1976); COGSA, supra note 1, at § 4(2)(a), 46
U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976).
35. Case law interpreting the Harter Act and COGSA is essentially interchangeable.
The principal difference is the Harter Act's requirement of seaworthiness as a condition
precedent to the enjoyment of any liability exemption. The Isis, 290 U.S. 333 (1933); Alaska
Native Industries Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 767, 771, 772 (W.D. Wash.
1962); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 155-56; Note, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 638, 640
(1972). There is no such condition precedent under COGSA which allows the exemptions as
long as the unseaworthiness is not causally related to cargo damage. California & Hawaiian
Sugar Co. v. Columbia Steamship Co., 510 F.2d 542, 543 (5th Cir. 1975); Horn v. Cia de
Navegacion Fruco, S.A., 404 F.2d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969)
Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co. v. M/S Black Heron, 324 F.2d 835-36 (2d Cir. 1963). How-
ever, where there is more than one effective cause including unseaworthiness, the fact that
[Vol. 3
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results in assigning liability for damaged cargo.36
L The Seaworthiness Question.
Seaworthiness is determined only at the beginning of the voyage.37
Problems in applying the law have been generated by (1) the absence of
a clear standard for seaworthiness and (2) by the tendency of the courts
to take an expansive view of unseaworthiness to prevent unjust results.
The Supreme Court has laid down the "general rule" that each
case must be decided on its facts.38 This rule effectively provides no
test for seaworthiness, leading to disparate results in similar fact set-
tings. For example, consider two cases where a ship's crew left ports
open. In one case, a burlap cargo was damaged by seawater because
the ship's ports were unknowingly left open. The court held that the
ship was unseaworthy.39 In the second case, cargo was damaged when
the crew negligently failed to close the ports during a storm at sea.4°
The ports had been intentionally left open upon departure. The ship
was deemed to be seaworthy, a finding which relieved the carrier of
liability.
Similarly, cases where damage to cargo was caused by putting
water in the wrong hold have had disparate results. In one case, cargo
was damaged when a crewman mistakenly stuck a fire hose into the
wrong sounding pipe.4' This was done because the ship lacked ade-
quate identification on and around pipe caps, a condition the court
found to constitute unseaworthiness. In the second case, damage was
one cause is exempted under COGSA does not eliminate the carricer's responsibility for un-
seaworthiness. Orient Mid-East Lines v. Shipment of Rice on Board S.S. Orient Trans-
porter, 496 F.2d 1032, 1041 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975); Spencer
Kellogg & Sons v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 32 F. Supp. 520, 531-32 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
36. See note 55 infra for discussion.
37. The Calendonia, 157 U.S. 124, 133, 134 (1895); The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S.
199, 210 (1894); The Steel Navigator, 23 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand). The burden of
proof to show unseaworthiness at the beginning of the voyage is on the cargo owner. The
burden of proof arises as follows: First, the cargo owner shows his goods were damaged.
Second, the carrier establishes the navigation or management exemption. Third, the burden
is shifted to the cargo owner to show unseaworthiness at the beginning of the voyage. Direc-
tor General of India Supply Mission v. The Maru, 459 F.2d. 1370-72 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973); Kimball, supra note 2, at 226. Fourth, the carrier can escape
liability by proving its exercise of due diligence. Mississippi Shipping Co. v. Zander & Co.,
270 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated as moot, 361 U.S. 115 (1959). For a discussion of the
burden of proof see Kimball, supra note 2, at 226.
38. International Navigation Co. v. Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co., 181 U.S. 218, 224 (1901).
39. Id. at 224-25.
40. The Silva, 171 U.S. 462, 465 (1898).
41. Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n v. Alaska Steamship Co, 404 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1968).
No. 1]
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caused by the crew ballasting with water into a tank containing cargo
rather than the intended empty tank.42 The court held this to be an
error in management within the exemption relieving the carrier of lia-
bility. Technical distinctions of this kind have been followed in numer-
ous other cases over the years.43 In most of these cases, the damage was
caused by crew negligence. Similar instances of crew negligence should
not warrant such varied results.44
Discomfort with the management or navigation exemption, which
is inconsistent with modem views of respondeat superior,43 has en-
couraged the courts to take an expansive view of unseaworthiness. In
one case, the Supreme Court determined unseaworthiness of a ship,
engaged in a long voyage, at an intermediate port.46 This decision was
a .deviation from the usual rule that unseaworthiness be determined at
the beginning of the voyage. The rationale for this deviation was that
the carrier's port manager had occasion to examine the vessel at the
intermediate port following a stranding incident. Unseaworthiness has
also frequently been expanded to include an inadequate 47 or incompe-
42. Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co. v. M/S Black Heron, 324 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1963).
Ballasting is to fill a hold in the ship so as to give'the shipgreater stability. WEBSTERS NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1976).
43. See, e.g., The Aakre, 122 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1941), cerl. denied, 314 U.S. 690 (1941)
(ship stranded because old chart on board did not show position of bouy but found seawor-
thy because crew could have discovered it easily); The President Polk, 43 F.2d 695 (2d Cir.
1930); The Steel Navigator, 23 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir. 1928) (failure to make fast manhole
covers before filling after peak with water did not make the ship unseaworthy unless it was
apparent before leaving port that the water ballast would be necessary in route); The
Oritani, 40 F.2d 522 (E.D. Pa. 1929); The Yungay, 58 F.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
44. It can be argued that the facts in the above cases are technically distinguishable and
that a lawyer can reasonably predict liability in most cases. Even if this is true it seems that
the presence of such fine distinctions in an adversary system only serve to generate higher
costs in the settlement process.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-49 (1958); W. PROSSER, Tim LAW
OF TORTS 460 (4th ed. 1971).
46. The carrier was held liable for the lack of "due diligence" to provide a seaworthy
vessel although the ship had been seaworthy upon departure from the original port. The
Isis, 290 U.S. 333 (1933). This situation should be distinguished from the concept of "sea-
worthiness by stages." "Seaworthiness by stages" applies where the carrier plans to refuel at
intermediate ports. The question as to the carrier's seaworthiness with respect to fuel is
asked at each port for the leg to follow, e.g., The Glymont, 66 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1933).
This latter theory is based on practical considerations and is not expansive since it allows the
carrier to depart from the original port without carrying the full amount of fuel to complete
the entire voyage. The Steel Navigator, 23 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand; dictum).
47. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 386 U.S. 724, 727 (1967); Orient Mid-East
Lines v. Shipment of Rice on Board S.S. Orient Transporter, 496 F.2d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1974); Aguiree v. Citizens Casualty Co., 441 F.2d 141, 144
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637,
647 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
[Vol, 3
Carriage of Goods by Sea
tent48 crew. Saying that seaworthiness included the reasonable expec-
tation of completing the voyage, one case went so far as to find a ship
unseaworthy when a multitude of unsatisfied creditors had the power
to arrest it at any time.49
This absence of a clear standard and the expansive approach to
unseaworthiness have generated uncertainty in determining where the
risks lie. Adoption of the Hamburg Rules would eliminate the naviga-
tion or management defense, reducing uncertainty and placing respon-
sibility for crew negligence on the carrier.
2 The Care of Cargo Questiom
Distinguishing acts of negligence in the "navigation or manage-
ment of the vessel"50 from acts of negligence in the "care and custody
of cargo"'51 is problematic for the courts. Liability accrues to the carrier
only for negligence in the care and custody of cargo. Since negligence
in navigating and managing a cargo laden ship would also cause a for-
seeable risk to cargo, the two phrases seem to overlap. 2
In The Germanic,5 3 Justice Holmes established the "primary pur-
pose" test to distinguish the two: "[T]he question which section is to
govern must be determined by the primary nature and object of the
acts which cause the loss." Justice Holmes stated, "If the primary pur-
pose is to affect the ballast of the ship," the act is management of the
vessel, "[b]ut if. . . the primary purpose is to get the cargo ashore, the
fact that it also affects the trim of the vessel does not make [it] the less"
a case of negligence in the care of cargo. t The "primary purpose" test
has been applied in virtually all subsequent cases with inconsistent re-
suits.55
48. Horn v. Cia de Navegacion Fruco, S.A., 404 F.2d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1968); The Vale Royal, 51 F. Supp. 412,426 (D. Md. 1943). A pilot's
lack of knowledge of the precise figures for the turning radius of a ship was not sufficient by
itself to establish an incompetent crew. In re Grace Lines, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), affd, 517 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1975).
49. Morrisey v. S.S.A. & J. Faith, 252 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
50. COGSA, supra note 1, at § 4(2)(a), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1976).
51. Id. § 3(2), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(2) (1976).
52. Grace Line, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d 361, 374 (9th Cir. 1974) (Carter,
J.).
53. The Germanie, 196 U.S. 589 (1906).
54. Id. at 597.
55. For example: (I) Damage caused by failure to ventilate or refrigerate the cargo
properly results in carrier liability for negligence in the care of cargo. Schnell v. The Valles-
cura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934) (failed to ventilate a cargo of onions en route). Vana Trading Co.
v. S.S. "Mette Skou," 556 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); United
States v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 511 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1975) (the strike exemption did
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The allocation of legal responsibility for damaged cargo should
not be based on so artificial a distinction. Liability should follow con-
trol and control rests with the carrier employing the crew. Adoption of
the Hamburg Rules not only eliminates a source of confusion but also
makes liability consistent with modem tort principles.
3. Collisions and "Both to Blame" Clauses.
Elimination of the navigation or management defense gives rise to
special considerations in cases where two vessels collide. In such cases,
even though the collision is due to the carrying vessel's error in naviga-
tion, that carrying vessel may indirectly be held liable for part of the
damage to its own cargo. This result, unique in navigation law, is due
to -the United States law on joint and several liability. A cargo owner
can bring suit against the non-carrying vessel, and thereby avoid its
own carrier's navigation or management defense.5 6 However, if the
non-carrying vessel is held liable for loss of cargo carried on the other
not relieve carrier of duty to care for cargo); Campagnie De Navigation Fraissinct et
Cyprien Fabre, S.A. v. Mondial United Corp., 316 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1963); Daido Line v.
Thomas P. Gongalez Corp., 299 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1962); Barr v. International Mercantile
Marine Co., 29 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1928) (failed to refrigerate cargo of pears). In Vana Trading,
the court refused to apportion the damage even though the shipper's own inadequate pack-
ing was a concurrent cause of the non-ventilation. The navigation exemption has been al-
lowed when the carrier's negligence in maintaining its course through a storm resulted in
sweat damage caused by inadequate ventilation. Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. The Mars, 172
F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
(2) Damage caused by improper ballasting is generally held to be negligence in the
management or navigation of the vessel thereby relieving the carrier of liability. General
Foods Corp. v. The Mormacsurf, 276 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822
(1960); Leon Bernstein Co. v. Wilhelmsen, 232 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1956). One case held,
however, that an officer's improper ballasting before the voyage rendered the carrier liable
under the seaworthiness test. American Mail Line v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.
Wash. 1974). In another case, the court found negligent cargo care when a master mistak-
enly directed the discharge of cargo from the after end of a barge allowing the bow to sink
and seawater to reach the cargo. The Joseph J. Hock, 70 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1934).
(3) Conversely, the court held in The Milwaukee Bridge that the master's failure to
inspect the hold after discovering leaking drums of sulphuric acid that ultimately damaged a
cargo of flour constituted negligent management rather than negligent care of cargo. The
Milwaukee Bridge, 26 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1928). In still another case, the Supreme Court
denied the management defense when wool was stored near a non-watertight bulkhead and
damaged by wet sugar stored aft of the bulkhead. The offloading of other cargo had caused
the vessels trim (balance) to shift and the liquid from the sugar to run into the compartment
where the wool was stowed. Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900); see also
Armco Int'l Corp. v. Rederi A/B Disa, 151 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1945) (leaking acid drum consti-
tuted negligence); General Foods Corp. v. The Troubador, 98 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(carrier held liable for improper loading of wet ores and dry coffee in the same hold).
56. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899); The Alabama and the Gamecock, 92 U.S.
695 (1875).
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vessel involved in a collision, it is entitled to contribution from the car-
rying vessel for that loss.57 This results in a carrier's liability for dam-
age to its own cargo even though the damage was caused by that
carrier's error in navigation of the vessel.
Carriers sought to avoid this result by using "both to blame"
clauses in the bill of lading. The clauses required the cargo owner to
indemnify the carrier for any indirect liability for damage to its own
cargo in collision cases. "Both to blame" clauses have been held inva-
lid as against public policy by the Supreme Court.58
The American courts have thus carved out an indirect exception to
the navigation or management defense. As a result, adoption of the
Hamburg Rules would not significantly change the liability for damage
to cargo in collision cases.5 9
4. Conclusions In Regard to the Navigation or Management
Exemption.
Overall, the management or navigation defense is a concept whose
time has passed. It dates from the days when a voyage was essentially a
joint venture between ship and cargo.6° Today this is no longer the
case. Survival of the exemption violates principles of respondeat supe-
rior and gives rise to fine distinctions with little economic or logical
significance.
B. The Fire Exemption
Arguments for eliminating the fire exemption are similar to those
for eliminating the navigation or management defense: inconsistency
with modem tort principles, and uncertainty in statutory interpretation.
Allowing the carrier to escape liability for damage to cargo caused by
negligence of the crew in starting a fire clearly conflicts with principles
of respondeat superior. The exception to the general rule of respondeat
superior is even broader under the fire exemption than under the navi-
gation or management exemption because the carrier will be relieved of
57. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
58. United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
59. This is not true if the non-carrying vessel is lost. For a more detailed analysis of
liability in collision cases see Kosanin, Cargo Rights and Responsibilities in Collision Cases,
51 TUL. L. Rv. 880 (1976-77).
60. Diamond, Q.C., The Division of Liability as Between Shio and Cargo (Insofar as It
Affects Cargo Insurance Under the New Rules Proposed by UNCITdL), 4 LLOYD'S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 39, 48-49 (1977). During the drafting of the Hamburg Rules, the U.S. delegation
proposed elimination of the navigator or management exemption. Sweeney, supra note 2, at
109.
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liability even if a crewman's negligent act in starting a fire was in pur-
suit of the duty to care for cargo." As with the navigation or manage-
ment defense, however, the courts have narrowly defined the fire
exemption. A carrier has even been held liable for failure toput out a
fire after being notified of its existence, though the fire had been started
by a crewman while the ship was at sea.6 2 A carrier is generally respon-
sible for fire damage originating in failure to exercise "due diligence"
to provide a seaworthy vessel.63
Uncertainty in application troubles the fire exemption as it does
the navigation or management exemption. Two statutory fire exemp-
tions with totally different language compound the problem: (1) The
Fire Statute, enacted in 1851, relieves the owner of a vessel of liability
for damage caused by fire "unless such fire is caused by the design or
neglect of such owner" (emphasis added);64 (2) COGSA article 4(2)(b)
relieves a carrier of liability for damage caused by fire "unless caused
by the actual fault or privity of the carrier" (emphasis added).6 5 While
failure to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is gener-
ally considered the "actual fault or privity of the carrier, '66 it may not
61. This "care of cargo" loophole that expands the scope of the fire exemption results
from the language of the fire exemption: COGSA, supra note I, at § 4(2)(b), 46 US.C.A.
§ 1304(2)(b) relieves the carrier of liability for damage resulting from fire, "unless caused by
the actual fault or privity of the carrier." The Fire Statute, 46 U.S.C. § 182, which dates
back to 1851, simultaneously provides a fire exemption in cases not covered by the COOSA
fire exemption. The Fire Statute relieves the owner of the ship from liability for cargo dam-
age resulting from fire, "unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of such owner."
The confusion caused by the different language of these two provisions is discussed in the
text.
62. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 499, 501 (9th
Cir. 1959). The court felt the Fire Statute and COGSA should be interpreted in the same
way. Id. at 501. The carrier in that case was denied the fire exemption because of its negli-
gent failure to use carbon dioxide toput out the fire when first notified of smouldering cargo,
See also Petition of Isbrandtsen, 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953); Gesellschaft Fur Getreidcn-
handel Ag. v. S.S. Texas, 318 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La. 1970).
63. See exceptions discussed within the context of this article.
64. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976). In a subsequent section, this exemption is extended to a
demise charter as well. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
65. COGSA, supra note 1, at § 4(2)(b), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976).
66. The familiar duty as to seaworthiness is therefore imposed under the COOSA fire
exemption. In re Liberty Shipping Corp., Motor Ship Don Jose Figueras, 509 F.2d 1249
(9th Cir. 1975) (unseaworthiness due to incompetent crew); Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie dc
Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973); Cerro Sales Corp. v.
Atlantic Marine Enterprises, Inc. 403 F. Supp. 562, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("the duty to pro-
vide a seaworthy ship is a non-delegable duty"). In Asbestos Corp., the court held that
unexcusable unseaworthiness "which in fact causes the damage. . . will exclude the ship-
owner from the exemption." Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet ct
Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1973).
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be considered the "design or neglect" of the "owner."'67 Some courts
have been willing to give the term "carrier" under COGSA a broader
application than the term "owner" under the Fire Statute. In Earle and
Stoddart v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, the Supreme Court construed the
Fire Statute, holding that the damage must be caused directly by the
vessel's owner before the fire exemption will be denied.6" This suggests
that the owner (or a high corporate officer in the case of a corporate
owner) must have caused the fire himself before the fire exemption will
be denied that owner under the Fire Statute's "unless clause." Under
this view, the fire exemption in the Fire Statute is much broader than
the fire exemption in COGSA which can be denied when the shipper
makes a showing of unseaworthiness at the beginning of the voyage.
Other courts treat the fire exemption under the Fire Statute and
COGSA identically.69 This confusion and excessive complexity could
be eliminated by omitting the fire exemption.
The fire exemption has been partially eliminated by the Hamburg
Rules. The elimination is less than total in that the Hamburg Rules
single out fire damage through a special provision shifting the burden
of proving carrier negligence.70 Under the Hamburg Rules, there is a
67. See note 68 infra.
68. Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J.). The ship's chief engineer was negligent in putting a new supply of coal on top of
the existing supply which subsequently overheated, causing a fire. See amso Consumers Im-
port Co. v. Kabushiki K.K. Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249 (1943); Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. S.S.
Luckenbach, 184 F. Supp. 134 (D. Ore. 1960) (interpreting the Fire Statute, iijpra note 23).
This broader interpretation seems to have been restricted to cases applying the fire statute.
Sweeney, szupra note 2, at 106, n.87. It is generally an onerous burden for cargo owners to
prove the owners' "design or neglect" under the Fire Statute and cargo owners will not
recover when the origin of the fire is a matter of speculation. In re G.B.R.M.S. Caldas, 350
F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afrid, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973).
69. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 499, 501 (9th
Cir. 1959).
70. Hamburg Rules, supra note 27, at art. 5(4):
(a) The carrier is liable:
i) for loss of or damage to the goods or delay in delivery caused by fire, if
the claimant proves that the fire arose from fault or neglect on the part of
the carrier, his servants or agents;
(ii) for such loss, damage or delay in delivery which is proved by the claim-
ant to have resulted from the fault or neglect of the carrier, his servants
or agents, in taking all measures that could reasonably be required to put
out the fire and avoid or mitigate its consequences.
(b) In case of fire on board the ship affecting the goods, if the claimant or the
carrier so desires, a survey in accordance with shipping practices must be held
into the cause and circumstances of the fire, and a copy of the surveyor's
report shall be made available on demand to the carrier and the claimant.
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general presumption against the carrier for lost or damaged goods.71 In
the case of fire damage, the presumption does not obtain and the bur-
den shifts to the cargo owner to prove the negligence of the "carrier, his
servants or agents."72 Such a provision remains consistent with current
rules which also place the burden of proving negligence in causing fire
damage on the cargo owner.73
Imposing this onerous burden on the cargo owner, however, is im-
practical. Principles of evidence generally place the burden of proof on
the party having the best access to evidence, the carrier in this case.
Although the new rules make a substantial improvement by eliminat-
ing.the fire exemption, they do not go far enough.
III. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
The Hamburg Rules attempt to solve two major problems relating
to the provisions limiting the carrier's liability for lost or damaged
goods. First, they define the term "package" for purposes of the pack-
age limitation. Second, they extend the carrier's liability limitation to
the carrier's agents in performance of the contract of carriage, a protec-
tion traditionally attempted through contract with a "Himalaya"
clause.74
A. What Is a Package?
The definition of "package" gains importance because the provi-
sion in COGSA § 4(5) limits the carrier's liability for lost or damaged
goods to "$500 per package. . . , or in case of goods not shipped in
packages, per customary freight unit."75  Modem container freight
71. Id. art. 5(1). For text of provision see supra note 28.
72. See supra note 70.
73. Under the COGSA navigation or management defense, if the cargo owner proves
the vessel unseaworthy, then the burden of proof shifts to the carrier. Under the COOSA
Fire Exemption, the cargo owner must prove unseaworthiness and must also prove the "car-
rier" or the "owner" of the vessel failed to exercise due diligence to make it seaworthy.
Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d 669, 672-
73 (2d Cir. 1973); Hanson & Orth, Inc. v. M/V Jalatarang, 450 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Ga, 1978).
74. The "Himalaya Clause" derives its name from Adler v. Dickson (The Himalaya)
(1955) 1 Q.B. 158 (1954), 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 315, where the House of Lords held that for
carriage of passengers and goods the law permitted the carrier to stipulate to application of
the liability limitation both for itself and those it hired to carry out the contract. This deci-
sion induced carriers to begin drafting "Himalaya" clauses to benefit stevedores and others,
75. Section 4(5) of the Hague Rules, supra note 17, simply says "per package or unit."
In both cases the limit applies "unless the nature and value of such goods have been de-
clared by the shipper before shipment. . . ." COGSA, supra note 1, at § 4(5), 46 U.S.C.
§ 1304(5) (1976). A declaration of higher value under the "unless clause" is unlikely be-
cause it would cause higher freight rates.
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shipping has challenged courts to determine whether the container or
the individual units inside the container constitute the "package" for
limitation purposes.76 Since intermodal containers did not exist in the
early part of this century when the COGSA package limitation was
developed, legislative history is not helpful."
Three conflicting methods of defining a "package" have evolved.
Some commentators78 and early cases in the Second Circuit,79 consis-
tent with the Hamburg Rules, favor looking to the enumeration on the
bill of lading. This contractual emphasis places greater weight on the
parties' intent.8 0 In Standard Electrica, Chief Judge Lumbard empha-
sized that any other approach "would place upon the carrier the burden
of looking beyond the information in the bill of lading or beyond the
outer packing to investigate the contents of each shipment."8'
In Royal Typewriter v. M/V Kuhnerland, the Second Circuit de-
parted from its earlier view and developed the "functional economics
test."8 2 This test involves two steps: first, the cartons inside the ship-
ping container are presumed to be "packages" if they would be func-
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. rev. 1968) defines a package as "a bundle put
up for transportation or commercial handling ...
77. DeOrchis, The Container and the Package Limitation--The Sear.chfor Preditabil;.
5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 251 (1974). An intermodal container is one designed for easy transfer
from ship to ship or from a ship to a land carrier.
78. See Tetley, Q.C., Per Package Limitation and Containers Under the Hague Rule.r,
Visby & UNCITRAL, 4 DALHOUSIE LJ. 685 (1978). "[Ihe key to determining what is a
package or unit for purposes of limitation is the intention of the parties, particularly as
declared on the bill of lading as prescribed by the rules." Id. at 688.
79. When the bill of lading listed the "number of packages" as "9 pallcts" the court
found that each pallet containing 6 boxes constituted a package. Standard Electrica S.A. v.
Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Geselschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Standard Electrica]. Until 1973,
Second Circuit cases seemed to comport fairly well with this view. In Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971), where the bill of lading identified the cargo as
"1 container s.t.c. [said to contain] 99 bales of leather," the court held that each individual
bale was a "package." Chief Judge Friendly considered a "package... more sensibly re-
lated to the unit in which the shipper packed the goods and described them than to a large
metal object . . . in which the carrier caused them to be contained." .d. at 815. In
Nichimen Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 335 (2d Cir. 1972), Chief Judge Friendly
determined that a coil of steel secured by metal bands is a package and stated that "[w]hile
the description on the bill of lading is not controlling [citation omitted] it is important evi-
dence of the parties' understanding ...
80. Standard Electrica, supra note 79, at 946.
81. Id. at 947.
82. Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1973). 350
cartons of adding machines were shipped in a container under a bill of lading describing the
cargo as "one container said to contain machinery." The court held that there was one
package, limiting the carrier's liability to S500. Id. at 646. The result would have been the
same under the bill of lading approach but the court expressly established a new test. Id. at
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tional for shipment overseas;8 3 second, the parties can overcome the
presumption by proving they intended otherwise."4 This second step is
consistent with the earlier Second Circuit approach. In the cases that
have since applied Kulmerland, no party has overcome the presump-
tion. 5
A federal district court in Washington State has developed a third
approach to defining a "package": the "plain, ordinary meaning" test.
In Matsushita Electris v. S.S. Aegis Spirit,86 Judge Beeks rejected both
the "functional economics test" and the Second Circuit's old bill of lad-
ing test. He concluded instead that the term "package" is to be given
its "plain, ordinary meaning" and not some "specialized or technical
meaning. 87 If the cartons are packages in the ordinary sense before
put into the carrier's container they do not lose that character after-
wards.8 8 Judge Beeks also concluded that the parties' intent has noth-
ing to do with the meaning of the term "package"; ". . . it is not the
parties' characterizations of the shipment, but the court's interpretation
648. Tetley asserts that the court would not have reached this result except for the fact that
the bill of lading specified "one container." Tetley, supra note 78, at 701.
83. Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 6,15, 648 (2d Cir. 1973).
Otherwise they are presumed not to be "packages." A package is considered functional if it
is suitable for shipment overseas without further modification.
84. Id. at 649.
85. Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 543 F,2d 967 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976) (the container of used household goods was the
"package"); Cameco v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974) (cartons of
tinned hams inside the container were the "package"). Baby Togs, Inc. v. S.S. American
Ming, 1975 A.M.C. 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
86. Matsushita Electris v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 906 (WD. Wash, 1976).
87. Judge Beeks cited a Ninth Circuit decision as support for this approach. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Lines, 491 F.2d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. den/ed, 419
U.S. 873 (1974) (a free standing transformer attached to a ski was not a package, so applied
the unit rule). Judge Beeks cites approvingly the article by DeOrchis. DeOrchis criticizes
the "functional economics test," and notes that the court in Kulmerland overlooked the fact
that a carrier, when it receives a container, usually has no way of knowing how the goods
inside the sealed container are packed and will not be able to predict its own liability. De-
Orchis, supra note 77, at 257. Contrarily, Judge Oakes rebuts DeOrchis' criticism, saying
that the carrier can find out how the goods are packed by having its agents present at each
container stuffing or by requiring greater specificity in the bill of lading. Cameco v. S.S.
American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1299 (2d Cir. 1974). DeOrchis also notes that in order to
get the benefit of the $500 limitation the shipper would have to pack each unit in an export
type package which would generate waste. In general, DeOrchis favors the Standard Elee-
trica approach of allowing the parties to define what they consider a package in the bill of
lading. (DeOrchis, supra note 77, at 257).
88. Matsushita Elecris v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 907 (W.D. Wash. 1976). In
Matsushita, the carrier provided the container but this rationale should also apply if the
shipper provides the container.
[Vol. 3
Carriage of Goods by Sea
of the statute that controls." 9 He claimed the parties' power to "chris-
ten something a package" makes the liability floor "illusory and negoti-
able."90 The "plain, ordinary meaning" test has been applied in two
subsequent district court decisions, one in Oregon9 and one in Vir-
ginia.9 2
The Hamburg Rules would eliminate the definitional problem
caused by the COGSA package limitation. Decisions considering the
package problem have noted the need for legislative action.93 The
Hamburg Rules replace the packages limitation with a package or
weight limitation: liability is limited to 835 "units of account" per
package or other shipping unit, or 2.5 units of account per kilo,94
whichever is higher.95 When the goods are consolidated in a container
89. Id. at 905.
90. Id.
91. Omark Indus. v. Associated Container Transp. (Australia) Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 139
(D. Ore. 1976) (Beeks, I., sitting by designation). Finding that each pallet was a "package,"
the court states that it is not the smallest unit that constitutes the "package," rather, it will
usually be "the largest individuated unit of packaged cargo made up by or for the shipper
... " Id. at 142. The court distinguishes the pallet from the container in Alatsushita say-
ing "the outer packaging of a palletized unit [is] an integral part of the cargo unlike a
container. . ." and a pallet does not resemble a "detachable stowage ompartment" of the
vessel, as does a container. Id. at 143.
92. Yeramex International v. Tendo, 1977 A.M.C. 1807 (ED. Va. 1977).
93. Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1300 (2d Cir. 1974). Royal
Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 814 (2d Cir. 1971); Standard Electrica, supra note 79, at
946-47.
94. Hamburg Rules, supra note 27, at art. 6(1):
(a) The liability of the carrier for loss resulting from loss of or damage to goods
according to the provisions of article 5 is limited to an amount equivalent to 835
units of account per package or other shipping unit or 2.5 units of account per
kilogramme of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.
(b) The liability of the carrier for delay in delivery according to the provisions of
article 5 is limited to an amount equivalent to two and a half times the freight
payable for the goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight payable under
the contract of carriage of goods by sea.
(c) In no case shall the aggregate liability of the carrier, under both subpara-
graphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, exceed the limitation which would be estab-
lished under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph for total loss of the goods with
respect to which such liability was incurred.
The unit of account is defined in Art. 26 as a Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the
International Monetary Fund. For a discussion of the SDR see Silard, Carriage of the SDR
by Sea: The Unit of Account of the Hamburg Rules, 10 J. MAP. L. & COi. 13 (1978).
95. Hamburg Rules, supra note 27, at art. 6(2):
For the purpose of calculating which amount is the higher in accordance with par-
agraph l(a) of this article, the following rules apply:
(a) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate
goods, the package or other shipping units enumerated in the bill of lading, if is-
sued, or otherwise in any other document evidencing the contract of carriage by
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or on a pallet, the Hamburg Rules provide that the enumeration found
on the bill of lading shall define the "package." The Hamburg Rules
thus resolve the package problem to a certain extent in favor of the
parties' intent as expressed in the bill of lading.96 By applying dual
limits of valuation, the Hamburg Rules answer Judge Beek's concern
over allowing the parties' intent to govern. The Hamburg Rules, there-
fore, reduce reliance on judicial interpretation of the term "package"
and address the modem containerization problem.
B. Himalaya Clause
The Hamburg Rules, in extending the carriers liability limitations
to stevedores and other independent contractors, maintain continuity
with current law. Under present law, a carrier can extend the protec-
tion of its limited liability to the stevedore through the use of what is
known as a "Himalaya" clause in the bill of lading. With the exception
of the United States, most countries refuse to honor such clauses. 97
While allowing such protection, 98 United States courts have strictly
construed "Himalaya" clauses and have denied the stevedore coverage
whenever the clause does not clearly provide protection.99 American
sea, as packed in such article of transport are deemed packages or shipping units.
Except as aforesaid the goods in such article of transport are deemed one shipping
unit.
(b) In cases where the article of transport itself has been lost or damaged, that
article of transport, if not owned or otherwise supplied by the carrier, is considered
one separate shipping unit.
96. It is arguable that bills of lading are so restricted by other commercial considera-
tions that they do not reflect the parties' actual intent. The resolution may be one in favor of
the shipper in most cases, since customs requirements tend to require specificity in shipping
documents.
97. Canadian General Electric Co. v. Pickford & Black, [1971] Can. S. Ct. 41 (Canada)
Midland Silicones, Ltd. v. Seruttons, Ltd. [1961] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 365, [1962] A.C. 446
(England, House of Lords); Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedoring Co., [1956] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
346, 364 (Australia High Court). The remainder of this discussion will generally use the
term "stevedore" to include both the stevedore who usually loads the goods and the terminal
operator.
98. Grace Line, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974); Tessler
Bros. (B.C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1974); Bernard Screen Printing
Corp. v. Meyer Line, 464 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1971) (clause
specifically stated "independent contractors"). Secrest Machine Corp. v. S.S. Tiber, 450
F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1971); Carle & Montanari, Inc. v. American Export Isbrandtscn Lines,
Inc., 386 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Phillips Bros. v. Mitsui
OSK Lines Ltd., 1976 A.M.C. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Michle Co. v. Hapag Lloyd, 1975
A.M.C. 654 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
99. In Cabot Corp. v. S.S. Mormacscan, 441 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1971), cer. denied, 404
U.S. 685 (1971), the court denied the stevedore the benefit of the limitation because the bill
of lading did not contain the required "clarity of language." Although clause 13 of the bill
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courts have also denied protection when the clause appeared too broad
in its coverage.1 00
The Hamburg Rules attempt to extend the same protection by
law.' 0 1 The carrier's defenses and liability limitations are extended to
"servants or agents" of the carrier acting within the scope of their em-
ployment. 102 The legislative history suggests that a stevedore is a "ser-
vant or agent" of the carrier." 3
While such protection is assured under the Hamburg Rules within
the "tackle to tackle" period, coverage after discharge from the vessel is
less clear. Article 4 of the Rules, in a complex provision, °4 purports to
of lading provided that the limitation would apply only to the "carrier," clause 2 defined
"carrier" to include "all persons rendering service in performance of this contract." Id. at
478. The court said it was not clear whether the term "carrier" in clause 13 meant to incor-
porate the phrase "all persons rendering service in performance of the contract" from clause
2, or even whether the latter phrase meant to include a stevedore who was loading another
shipper's goods (which were dropped on the plaintiffs goods). The court suggested that the
term "stevedore" should have been used if that was what the parties intended. .d. at 479.
See also Schiess-Froriep Corp. v. S.S. Finnsailor, 574 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1978);
Toyomenka, Inc. v. S.S. Tosaharu Maru, 523 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1975) (defendant was a guard
service hired by the stevedore and the "Himalaya" clause stated "independent contracts...
used. . . by the carrier"); DeLaval Turbine, Inc. v. West India Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 259
(3d Cir. 1974); Magnun Marine v. Kenosha Auto Transport Corp., 481 F.2d 933 (5th Cir.
1973); Rupp v. International Terminal Operating Co., 479 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1973) (same
provision as in Cobalt except the stevedore was handling the shipper's cargo); Hanson &
Orth, Inc. v. M/J Jalatarang, 450 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Georgia 1978).
100. LaSalle Machine Tool, Inc. v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 217 (D. Md.
1978). The clause included "any independent contractor performing services including
stevedoring in connection with the goods hereunder." The court found it "so broad as to be
unreasonable." Id. at 221.
101. Hamburg Rules, supra note 27, at art. 7(2). The Hamburg Rules add unnecessary
complexity by providing further that the carrier or its servants or agents will be denied the
liability limitation if the damage is caused intentionally or recklessly. Hamburg Rules,
supra note 27, at art. 8.
102. Id. art. 7(2).
103. Tetley, Q.C., The Himalaya Clause-Heresy or Genius, 9 J. MAP. L. & Comt. Il1,
127 (1977), Sweeney, supra note 3, at 340. This point of view is supported by the fact that
the drafters derived the provision from a similar provision in Article 3 of the Brussels Proto-
col. The Protocol expressly excluded independent contractors in a parenthetical phrase and
the phrase was excluded from the draft. Brussels Protocol (Hague-Visby) Art. 3 provides,
"If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant or agent
not being an independent contractor) such servant or agent shall be entitled to avail himself
of the defenses and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under the con-
vention." Sweeney, supra note 2, at 340.
104. Article 4(l) of the Hamburg Rules provides that the Hamburg Rules apply while
"the carrier is iii charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the
port of discharge". (empahsis added). Article 4(2) defines the period "the carrier is deemed
to be in charge of the goods" as:
(a) from the time he has taken over the goods from:
(i) the shipper or a person acting on his behalf; or
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extend coverage before loading and after discharge. Under the Rules'
definition of delivery, such protection may be illusory since, strictly
construing the provision, the carrier can avoid application of the rules
after discharge by declaring in the bill of lading that "delivery" takes
place at discharge from tackle to the open wharf.'05
Article 4 also encourages confusion as to the time of delivery by
permitting "usage" of trade to govern in some instances. 0 6 The cargo
owner could invoke trade usage to deny the stevedore the protection of
the rules. 0 7 The extension of protection to the stevedore after dis-
charge is therefore uncertain.0 8 Though a more liberal construction of
this provision would provide such protection, statutory modification
would guarantee consistency. 09 Adoption of the Hamburg Rules with
a modified Article 4 should reduce the litigation generated by poor
drafting of "Himalaya" clauses." 0 A modified Article 4 would main-
tain the protection such clauses have historically provided.
(ii) an authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to law or
regulations applicable at the port of loading, the goods must be handed
over for shipment;
(b) until the time he has delivered the goods:
(i) by handing over the goods to the consignee; or
(ii) in cases where the cosignee does not receive the goods from the carrier,
by placing them at the disposal of the consignee in accordance with the
contract or with the law or with the usage of the particular trade, appli-
cable at the port of discharge; or
(iii) by handing over the goods to an authority or other third party to whom,
pursuant to law or regulations applicable at the port of discharge, the
goods must be handed over. (emphasis added).
Article 4(3) provides that the terms "carrier" and "consignee" include servants or agents of
the carrier or consignee.
105. The clause in Art. 4(2)(b)(ii), "in accordance with the contract", suggests this can be
done. It is doubtful that the drafters intended such an escape.
106. Id. art. 4(2)(b)(ii).
107. Tetley, supra note 103, at 127 (discussing the Uncitral draft which has been modi-
fied.) This is important because the carrier could provide for its own exculpation beyond the
period covered by the Rules, but would not be able to totally exculpate the stevedore from
all liability. A clause purporting to do so is void as against sound policy. Grace Line, Inc. v.
Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d 361, 373 (9th Cir. 1974).
108. The stevedore may still need the protection of a "Himalaya" clause for this period.
109. The attempted extention of coverage beyond the "tackle to tackle" period provided
in Art. 4 of the Hamburg Rules is not unusual. Similar coverage during this period is pro-
vided by the Harter Act. Harter Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). It is not available, how-
ever, under COGSA.
110. The problems suggested could be avoided by the addition of a clear definition of
"delivery."
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IV. THE CHANGE IN STATUTORY LANGUAGE
An objective assessment of the Hamburg Rules requires an ac-
knowledgment of recent criticism. Criticism focuses chiefly on the
changes in statutory language. Writers have lamented the loss of terms
of art such as "due diligence" "seaworthiness", "perils of the sea", and
"deviation". 1 ' The replacement of the carrier's duty to exercise "due
diligence" with the requirement that the carrier prove "he, his servants
or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid
the occurrence and its consequences"' 12 is frequently mentioned.
Much of this criticism seems unwarranted. Most of these terms
originate in the common law and attach to the archaic catalogue of
exemptions. The elimination of the catalogue should reduce their im-
portance. Where these terms are still useful in litigating the question of
carrier negligence, reference to them will still be available through the
common law.
As is true of any new legislation, the new rules will require some
refinement by the courts; they are not entirely unambiguous. One ex-
ample of this ambiguity is the provision extending the application of
the rules beyond the tackle to tackle period, which has already been
discussed in relation to the "Himalaya" clause above. Another exam-
ple is the replacement of the standard of "due diligence" with the stan-
dard of reasonableness embodied in the words "that could reasonably
be required". The meaning of the reasonableness standard will be
much litigated, but it is difficult to see how the substantial changes em-
bodied in the new rules can be achieved without some litigation. Even
if the rules had retained the concept of "due diligence", the courts
would still have to determine its application in situations where the
carrier is liable under the new rules but not under the old." 3 Arguing
for the retention of archaic rules because the new rules would require
courts to define new terms is untenable in light of the number of cases
still arising under the old rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The current rules governing carrier liability clearly need updating.
Under the present carrier exemptions, allowing the carrier to escape
liability for the negligence of its crew runs contrary to modem princi-
11I. Diamond, supra note 60, at 42.
112. Hamburg Rules, supra note 27, at art. 5(1).
113. These situations arise where the navigation or management defense or the fire ex-
emption continue to apply under the old rules.
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ples of tort and agency law. Uncertainty in application enhances the
argument for abolishing the carrier exemptions. The provisions limit-
ing the carrier's liability are also outdated. Modern containerization
requires modem legislation.
In general, the Hamburg Rules provide an appropriate answer to
these needs. Though modification to eliminate the provision shifting
the burden of proof in fire damage cases and to clarify coverage beyond
the "tackle to tackle" period is desirable, the absence of such modifica-
tion does not warrant rejection of the Hamburg Rules.1t 4 The
Hamburg Rules provide an opportunity to update the law governing
carriage of goods, and still retain the uniformity so vital to interna-
tional shipping.
114. Modification of a multilateral treaty is unlikely since it would probably require re-
convening the conference which adopted the treaty. Such reconvening would occur only if
an insufficient number of nations ratified the convention.
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